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The Impact of Globalization on Investment and Agricultural Restructuring: 
 






Agricultural credit and rural finance problems are important constraints on 
restructuring, investment, and thus on recovery and growth in transition countries.  The 
problems are due to a combination of “normal” imperfections of rural credit and risk 
markets and specific transition problems such as macroeconomic instability, institutional 
reforms of the financial system, low profitability in agriculture, accumulated debts, high risk 
and uncertainty, and general contract enforcement problems (OECD, 1999, 2001). 
Financing can come both from own resources and from (formal or informal) loans.  
Transition has constrained both sources of credit.  Own financial resources are constrained 
because hyperinflation wiped out many savings in early transition, and low profitability and 
cash flow problems have complicated building up own resources during transition. Access 
to external credit has suffered from the same, and other, problems.  Financial institutions are 
less likely to lend to enterprises with low profitability, outstanding debts, and cash flow 
problems.  In addition, institutional problems such as ongoing reforms of the banking 
systems and the farms, a lack of credit history, high monitoring costs, etc. contribute to 
these problems (Swinnen and Gow, 1999).  
While early discussions of the finance problems focused mostly on the institutional 
problems, later studies emphasize profitability and cash flow problems.  For example, 
Pederson et al. (1997) emphasize the importance of profitability and cash flow problems in 
the perceived “excessive debt burden” of Russian farms.  Another example is a 1998 
Romanian survey, where farmers identify insufficient income as the key reason for their   2
loan application being rejected - 52% of the cases, much more than lack of collateral (18%) 
or outstanding debts (11%) (Davis et al. 1998). 
An important factor in the cash flow and profitability problems are contract 
enforcement problems throughout the agri-food chain (Gow and Swinnen, 1998, 2001).  A 
widespread effect is delayed payments for product deliveries.  A survey of food companies 
in Central Europe identified payment delays as their constraint number one for growth 
(Gorton et al. 2000).  Data from Slovakian farms show that payment delays are strongly 
correlated with profitability problems (Gow and Swinnen, 1998).  A survey of Hungarian 
agricultural enterprises shows that for 61% of the farms contract breaches under the form of 
delayed payments are an important impediment to expanding profits (Cungu and Swinnen, 
2002). 
These finance problems have induced political pressure for governments to 
intervene.  In many transition countries, governments have reacted by introducing credit 
subsidies and loan guarantee programs.  The impact of these programs varies considerably 
(Swinnen and Gow, 1999).  However, more importantly, progress in macro-economic and 
institutional reforms has reduced some of the institutional constraints and, especially in the 
more advanced transition countries, farm access to finance has gradually improved during 
transition.  Yet, important imperfections and constraints remain. 
Not only policy reforms but also private company restructuring has contributed to 
overcoming finance constraints.  Agribusiness restructuring and investments up- and 
downstream from the farms have contributed to reducing farm finance constraints (Gow and 
Swinnen, 2001).  Typically following a significant restructuring of the agribusiness 
companies, and often following foreign investment, companies have initiated programs to 
assist farms with accessing inputs and to provide supplier credit and other financial 
assistance.     3
There are several theories that try to explain the existence and use of supplier credit.  
Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide a comprehensive overview.  First, business partners may 
have an advantage over traditional lenders in investigating each other’s creditworthiness – 
through their interaction in the business relationship, as well as a better ability to monitor 
and force repayment of credit.  Second, supplier credit may be offered as a means to price 
discriminate.  Finally, supplier credit may reduce the transaction costs of paying bills.  In a 
situation where a supplier of goods grants supplier credit to a customer, transaction costs 
can be lowered if the customer has the option to cumulate obligations and pay for instance 
only monthly instead of paying every time the goods are delivered. 
While case studies suggest that the impact of these financial assistance programs has 
been significant in some cases (Gow et al., 2000), there is little evidence to measure their 
relative importance.  Among the few existing exceptions are two influential studies by 
Johnson et al. (1999) and McMillan and Woodruff (1999), which analyse factors affecting 
contract enforcement and supplier credit in several transition countries. 
In this paper we study agricultural investments and specifically the role of supplier 
credit in Polish agriculture, with emphasis on the dairy sector.  Agriculture, predominantly 
on small farms, remains a dominant sector in Polish rural areas.  Dairy plays an important 
role since many of the small farms have at least some milk production.  The small scale of 
production, both at the farm level and at the processing level, makes that the dairy 
processing sector and the farms are in need of substantial restructuring and investments to 
upgrade technology in order to be competitive on the international market.   
Polish agriculture is a-typical in the transition world because it remained largely 
private throughout the communist era.  Yet, the private farms were only allowed to operate 
within a centrally planned system with fixed prices and subsidies, much like in other 
communist countries.  Moreover, strict constraints were imposed on the size of private   4
farms (Wilkin, 2000).  As a result Polish agriculture was dominated by small private farms 
at the early 1990s. While this implied more inherent human capital for individual farming 
than in other countries, the rigid communist environment had seriously undermined 
entrepreneurship in farming and farmers had become used to rely on subsidized prices and 
inputs.  Moreover, the private farms were generally too small for some basic investments 
requiring scale economies, such as on-farm cooling tanks in dairy production.  Hence, in 
contrast to larger farms in neighbouring countries, milk quality was generally poor for these 
reasons.  For example, in Slovakia large dairy farms that dominate the milk market, now 
and before, generally had basic investments, such as on-farm cooling equipment, and much 
higher milk quality standards than small Polish dairy farms.  The initial conditions in 
Poland thus implied a major need for restructuring both in terms of farm size and in terms of 
upgrading of investments and quality standards etc.  
In this paper, we combine insights from a series of in-depth interviews with 
domestic and foreign owned dairy processing companies as well as from a random survey 
of (potential) local suppliers (dairy farms) to these companies.  We also interviewed some 
dairy equipment suppliers.  In combination the collected information constitutes a unique 
dataset on the financing and investment by (small) suppliers in the Polish dairy sector.  
The paper is organised as follows.  First, we discuss the data.  Next, we discuss 
qualitative evidence on investments and financing in the dairy sector and the role of private 
supplier credit.  Finally, we present an econometric analysis to identify the determinants of 
access to supplier credit.  The last section draws conclusions. 
 
Data 
To study agricultural investments and specifically the role of supplier credit we 
collected data through a series of in-depth interviews with domestic and foreign owned   5
dairy processing companies and a random survey of local dairy farms which are potential 
suppliers to these companies.  
 
Small suppliers 
The farm-level data collection focused on small suppliers and the data were 
collected in a 2001 survey of 290 dairy producing rural households in the Warminsko-
Mazurskie region in the North-East of Poland.  Warminsko-Mazurskie is an interesting 
region for this analysis because it is an important dairy region in Poland and because it has a 
mixture of large scale and small-scale farms – unlike some other regions in Poland.  At the 
start of transition large-scale state farms (cooperatives were almost non-existent in Poland) 
farmed between 30% and 50% of agricultural land in the region.
1   
We interviewed 290 rural households who had at least had some dairy production in 
the past six years.  This survey was performed in the fall of 2001 and included retrospective 
questions on changes that had occurred over the previous six years – more or less the period 
after the arrival of foreign investors in dairy companies in the region.  The households were 
selected randomly in certain municipalities.  As in the rest of Poland, domestic dairies still 
far outnumber foreign owned dairies.  To ensure that the sample included a considerable 
number of farmers that had been in contact with foreign owned dairy companies and their 
policies, we over-represented municipalities in the vicinity to the three foreign owned 
dairies in the region (ICC - Paslek; Warmia Dairy; Kraft/Bel - Chorzele).
2   
Most of the so-called “farms” listed in the official Polish statistics as dairy farms are 
merely households producing for home consumption.  They account for the vast majority of 
the 1 and 2 cow “farms” which make up 70% of the total number of dairy farms in Poland 
                                                             
1 Estimate on the basis of data on old voivodship classifications (Wies I Rolnictwo, 1999) 
2 Using a list of supplying farmers from the foreign owned dairy companies would create a selection bias since 
a list of current suppliers will exclude any farmers that have stopped supplying over the past years.   6
and 36% of dairy farms in Warminsko-Mazurski (table 1).  Because of the focus of our 
analysis, i.e. to measure the extent and impact of supplier credit from the processing sector 
to suppliers, our survey concentrated on those households which delivered at least some 
milk to dairies at the start of the period covered by the survey (1995).  As a consequence, 
households with 1 to 2 cows represent a smaller group in our survey sample: 3% in 1995 
and 10% in 2000. 
However, even with this selection focus, the vast majority of the farms in the sample 
are very small by (West or East) European standards.  The majority of farms in the sample 
(57%) had less than 10 cows and 96% of the farms had less than 20 cows in 1995 (Table 1).  
The average size of dairy farms in the sample was 8.8 cows in 1995 and 10.5 cows in 2000.   
 
Dairy companies 
The structure of the dairy sector has changed over the past decade (see table 2).  The 
total number of dairies has decreased by 22% between 1993 and 1999. This decrease was 
mainly caused by a decrease in the number of cooperatives, while the number of private 
companies has almost doubled. Yet, in 1999 dairy cooperatives still controlled 70% of the 
market. Twenty (40%) of the privately owned dairies had majority foreign investor 
ownership. 
We selected six dairy companies for in-depth interviews with the management.  The 
selection of the dairy companies was based on three criteria: FDI, ownership structure, and 
size.  In terms of foreign investment, two of the selected companies are majority foreign 
owned, two have important links to foreign companies, and two are purely domestic.  Four 
are medium size companies (50-70 million litres of milk) with one large (420 million litres) 
and one small (2.5 million litres).  Three are cooperatives, two private, and one a joint 
venture of a cooperative and a private company.  More specifically:    7
•  MLEKPOL is one of the largest dairy cooperatives in Poland, 100% domestically 
owned, and currently receives milk from 14,000 dairy farmers.  It produces a wide 
variety of products. 
•  MLECZARNIA is a small domestically owned private company.  Its main production 
consists of yoghurts.  The Polish yoghurt market is highly concentrated, with 70% of the 
market dominated by only 3 companies: Danone (French); Zott (German); Bakoma 
(Polish).  Mleczarnia only sells its products to local shops. 
•  KURPIE is a middle sized domestic cooperative.  In 2000, Hochland (a German/French 
investor) opened a processing plant next to Kurpie.  ‘Kurpie’ is the sole supplier of 
cheese to Hochland, which produces secondary level processed cheeses. 
•  MAZOWSZE is also a middle sized Polish dairy cooperative.  Since 1993 they started 
supplying pasteurised milk to the dairy multinational Kraft, who had bought the 
cooperative’s debts from the bank and in this way acquired part of the cooperative’s 
buildings.  In 1998, the Kraft operation was taken over by Bel, a French company.  Bel 
still buys milk from Mazowsze. 
•  ICC PASLEK was founded in 1994 when Land O’ Lakes (USA) entered into a 50-50 
joint venture with the local dairy cooperative in Paslek.  Through consecutive capital 
injections, Land O’ Lakes currently has a 70% ownership share in ‘ICC Paslek’. 
•  WARMIA DAIRY started as a joint venture between Hoogwegt, a Dutch dairy 
company, and a local dairy cooperative in 1995.  Since 1997, Hoogwegt has acquired 
100% ownership. 
In the next section we discuss investments and financing of these investments at the 
level of the small suppliers.  Later on we develop an econometric model to assess the 
importance of supplier credit provided by the dairy companies and we determine the crucial 
factors underlying the access to supplier credit for the small suppliers.   8
 
Empirical evidence on investments and finance in the Polish dairy sector  
A recent World Bank study concluded that supplier credit is important in Polish 
agriculture, but that it is primarily targeted to larger farms. Very large companies, both input 
suppliers and downstream companies (including supermarkets), provide credit as part of a 
larger business relationship and this appears to be a very important source of credit for the 
largest 12% of farms in Poland (World Bank, 2001).  These findings are consistent with 
studies from other countries which suggest that vertical contracting and support is mostly 
with larger farms as processing companies, especially foreign investors, prefer large 
suppliers to minimize transaction costs (Key and Runsten, 1999; Dolan and Humphrey, 
2000). 
However, our own findings, as we will explain next, suggest a different conclusion 
and show that supplier credit is not limited to large farms.  Also for small farms supplier 
credit is very important, and most farms use a combination of bank loans and dairy 
financing, with the source of financing strongly determined by the type of investment. 
 
Supplier credit and financial assistance programs of dairy companies 
All the interviewed dairies have programs that assist their supplying farms.  All have 
an input (esp. feed) supply program.  The companies provide access to inputs, such as feed 
or seeds and fertilizers for on-farm feed production.  Farmers purchase the inputs through 
company shops and the inputs are paid from the milk checks.  One company also made a 
special feed mixer available at the dairy for its suppliers.  Farmers were taught how to 
prepare high quality feed for their animals, and are allowed to use the equipment to prepare 
their own feed mix.     9
Five out of six companies assist farms in investing through credit programs.   
Investment assistance takes the form of leasing of equipment and cows, also with payments 
deducted from future payments for milk deliveries, as well as loans for buying new or 
second hand cooling and milking equipment.  The only dairy which did not provide credit 
assistance programs or agricultural extension services to its suppliers was the small dairy 
‘Mleczarnia’, probably because it did not have sufficient means (size). 
Most of the companies also provide extension services to their suppliers.  Technical 
assistance and support is provided through the company’s extension agents.  These 
specialists assist farmers with crop production, animal nutrition and health, animal genetics, 
breeding, selection and more recently they also assist farmers who want to expand their 
herds to find suitable cows for purchase both in Poland and in Western Europe.  In some 
cases these extension programs had a large impact on delivered milk quality because major 
improvements resulted from introducing basic hygienic and sanitary rules when handling 
the milk on the farm. 
Finally, five of the dairies provide bank loan guarantees for bank loans to farmers.  
Almost all bank loans for farm investments are with preferential interest rates (subsidized 
interest rates around 5% compared to commercial loans with interest rates often above 
20%). In order to obtain such a loan, the farmer needs collateral.  However, in many cases 
land or buildings are not accepted as a bank guarantee.  Therefore, most interviewed dairies 
are providing an additional service to their suppliers by co-signing the bank loan.  In this 
way the dairy puts in the bank loan guarantee and facilitates its farmers’ access to bank 
credits and hence increases their investment possibilities. 
 
Farm investments and credit sources   10
More than three quarters (76%) of all households in the survey made investments in 
the past ten years.  Of those who invested, 58% used loans, and the rest (42%) used own 
resources to finance the investment (see table 3). 
There are important differences in investment behaviour by farm size.  Only half of 
the farms (52%) with 1-5 cows made investment compared to 78% of the 6-10 cow farms.  
Almost all (92%) of the farms with more than 10 cows made investments.  
Also the source of investment finance differs by size category.  Three quarters 
(74%) of the largest farms use loans to finance the investments, while only slightly more 
than half of the other farms use loans.  
From those who obtain credit, 43% get credit from the dairy company, and 69% get 
a loan from a bank (including 10% who get loans from both sources).  Of those who get 
loans from the banks the vast majority does so under so-called preferential, i.e. subsidized, 
interest rates.  In fact, 60.4 % of the households had used preferential bank loans in the past, 
while only 11% had ever used bank loans on commercial terms.  Moreover, preferential 
bank loans provide cheaper credit than the dairies: on the question why households who 
invested did not use loans from the dairy the most important reason (42%) was that they 
could get cheaper loans elsewhere.  
In summary, small farms are less likely to invest than larger farms and if they do, 
they are more likely to do it using own resources.  Almost all farms over 10 cows invest, 
and three quarters of them use loans, both from the banks and from dairies.  Moreover, 
while the share of loans from the dairy company is stable across size classes, the farms with 
less than 5 cows are less likely to obtain a loan from the banks.   
Further, table 4 suggests that the reason why loans come from dairies or from banks 
may have more to do with the type of investment than with the characteristics of the farm.  
Dairy loans are used almost uniquely for investments in enlarging and upgrading the   11
livestock herd (30%) and cooling tanks (56%).  Together these account for 86% of all dairy 
loans.  In contrast, only 29% of all bank loans are used for these types of investments.  Bank 
loans are used more for investments in stalls (new, enlarging, or modernizing), land, and 
other investments.  
Table 4 also illustrates that investments in land and in cooling tanks are financed 
relatively more from loans.  This holds even more for investments in new cooling tanks 
(63%) than in second hand cooling tanks (44%).   
Table 5 indicates that supplier credit, i.e. loans from the dairy, for investments are 
especially important for small to medium size loans. For investment loans up to 10,000 PLZ 
the dairy provides around one-third of the loans. For larger loans (10-50,000 PLZ), the share 
of dairy loans declines (22%).  Loans over 50,000 PLZ come almost exclusively (93%) 
from the banks under preferential, i.e. subsidized, loans.   
Table 5 confirms also how in general commercial bank loans are very limited in 
Polish agriculture as most of the bank loans have subsidized interest rates.    
Note that the loans from dairies are only a partial indicator of the financial assistance 
offered by dairies.  As explained above, part of their assistance is under the form of loan 
guarantees with the banks.  Hence, part of the loans given by the banks are indirectly due to 
these loan guarantee programs of dairies.  The importance of these is emphasized by 
answers to the question why households could not obtain preferential bank loans.  Almost 
half (45%) of the households who could not obtain preferential bank loans identified lack of 
sufficient collateral as the main reason.  
Table 6 provides further evidence that dairy financial assistance programs have been 
very important in stimulating on-farm investments.  The share of farms that made recent 
investments is significantly larger in the group that delivers to dairies with assistance   12
programs (86.5% on average) compared to those that deliver to dairies without assistance 
programs (66.4 % on average).   
Interestingly, the largest difference is for the input supply program.  This suggests 
that the indirect investment impact of the programs may be even more important than the 
direct impact.  The programs which assist farms in accessing inputs (mainly feed) are likely 
to affect investment indirectly by enhancing the profitability of the farm by lowering input 
costs, or reducing transaction costs in accessing inputs.  As such they affect investments 
through improved profitability or through reduced transaction costs in input access. 
The story is similar when we look at changes in herd size (table 7), although less 
farms have increased their herd size (53% on average with assistance, and 40.5% without) 
than have made investments in general (87% on average with, and 66% without).  Yet there 
is a significant difference in herd size upgrading between farms delivering to dairies with 
and without assistance programs. 
Finally, we found no significant difference in 2001 in most of the assistance 
programs provided by foreign owned companies and domestic dairies (see table 8).  The 
only exception is loan guarantee programs that were more extensively provided by the 
foreign owned dairies.  The latter may be due to the more sophisticated financing 
arrangements or financial provisions needed for the loan guarantee programs, compared to 
the other assistance programs.   
Other evidence suggests that foreign investment has played a more important role 
early on in transition as an initiator of change and institutional innovation.  For example, 
foreign companies have played a role by providing an example in quality improvement 
strategy.  When Land O’ Lakes invested in ICC Paslek in 1994, milk quality of its 
supplying farms – as everywhere in the region – was poor.  From the start, ICC Paslek set 
out a clear strategy to increase the quality of delivered milk.  One of their requirements was   13
that the cooperative – from which they lease collection stations – should install cooling 
tanks in these collection points.  Furthermore, they invested in agricultural extension to raise 
farmers’ awareness of the importance of milk quality and to improve quality through basic 
hygienic rules for farmers handling the milk.  Local dairy companies quickly learned about 
these changes in company policies implemented by foreign owners.  Soon after Land O’ 
Lakes set up its quality improvement programs, local dairies started to copy these practices 
and this resulted in important spill-over effects.  This process is reflected in the dramatic 
milk quality improvement throughout the region in the last five years.  Our survey shows 
that the share of farms delivering extra class milk (the highest quality by EU standards) was 
significantly larger among farmers delivering to foreign owned dairies (58% versus 38% 
among farmers delivering to domestic dairies) in 1995.  However, by 2000 this gap had 
almost disappeared: 83% versus 79% of farms delivering to foreign versus domestic dairies 




Model and Variables 
To complement our qualitative insights and to econometrically identify the 
determinants of supplier credit in the Polish dairy sector, we estimate a model, following the 
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where TRADECREDIT is a dummy taking the value of 1 if investment i was financed with 
supplier credit from the dairy processing company and 0 otherwise; A is a vector of k 
variables identifying the relationship of the supplier to the dairy company; B is a vector of l 
variables related to the investment and previous investment behaviour of the household; C is 
a vector of m variables controlling for differences on the level of the farm and farm 
operator; and finally ξ i,t is the error term. 
Estimating equation (1) using standard maximum likelihood regression techniques 
will only take into account farms that actually made investments in the period that we 
consider.  Such analysis, based on a sample of investing farms only, may be biased due to 
sample attrition.  Therefore, we use a two-step Heckman model.  First, a selection equation 
is estimated by maximum likelihood as an independent probit model to determine which 
farms have invested using information from the whole sample of suppliers.  A vector of 
inverse Mills ratios (estimated expected error) can be generated from the parameter 
estimates.  The source of financing is observed only when the selection equation equals 1.  
Then, for the suppliers that invest, the source of financing is regressed on the explanatory 
variables and the vector of inverse Mills ratios from the selection equation.  Therefore, the 
second stage reruns the regression with the estimated expected error included as an extra 
explanatory variable, removing the part of the error term correlated with the explanatory 
variables and avoiding the bias. 
Each observation in the econometric analysis identifies a possible investment in one 
of nine possible investment categories: building, enlarging or modernising a stall for cattle; 
buying new milking cows; buying a new or second-hand cooling tank for milk; buying or 
modernising a milk line; buying land; buying or modernising other agricultural equipment.  
The dependent variables in the two estimations are INVEST and TRADECREDIT, 
respectively.  INVEST is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if an investment was made in a   15
certain asset between 1999 and 2001 and it takes the value of 0 if no investment was made 
in that asset in the specified period.  TRADECREDIT is defined as a dummy taking the 
value of 1 if the investment was financed with supplier credit from the dairy processing 
company and 0 otherwise. 
The first set of explanatory variables is related to the dairy company and the 
relationship between the supplier and the dairy.   
DURATION is an indicator of the length of the relationship between the supplier 
and the dairy company, and measures the number of years that the household has been 
supplying to the dairy company to which it supplied at the time of the investment (or in case 
no investment was made in a certain asset, it measures the number of years the household 
has delivered to the dairy company to which it delivered in 1999).  DURATION is expected 
to have a positive effect on the probability to receive supplier credit (McMillan and 
Woodruff, 1999 and Johnson et al., 1999).  Fafchamps and Minten (1999) also point to the 
importance of existing relationships for access to supplier credit.  A more stable relationship 
with the dairy company may also stimulate the milk producer to make investments so that 
we expect a positive impact of DURATION on INVEST. 
FDI is a dummy, which takes the value of 1 if the household delivered its milk to a 
foreign owned dairy company at the time of the investment (or in 1999 in case no 
investment was made in a certain asset), and takes the value of 0 otherwise.  The expected 
impact of FDI on the probability to receive supplier credit is positive because foreign owned 
processing companies have been shown to act as initiators of institutional innovations and 
hence are expected to be ahead of domestic dairy companies in offering credit assistance 
programs.  Furthermore, domestic firms may be more financially constrained and 
consequently may not be able to offer credit to their suppliers.  We also expect that farmers   16
supplying to foreign owned dairy companies might be more stimulated to invest.  If so, we 
should find a positive impact of FDI on INVEST. 
Tests show that there is significant positive correlation between DURATION and 
FDI (correlation coefficient: 28%), meaning that farms that deliver to a foreign owned 
company seem to have had a more stable business relationship with that dairy company than 
farms delivering to domestic dairies.  Hence, the variables FDI and DURATION may not be 
independent.  To test for the impact of possible multicollinearity problems in the estimation, 
we also ran restricted models (Models B and C) where DURATION and FDI are excluded, 
respectively. 
The next group of explanatory variables in the analysis are characteristics of the 
investment and investment history of the household.   
INVESTYPE is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if a dairy-specific investment was 
made, i.e. if the household invested in buying new cows, a new or second-hand cooling 
tank, or a milk line, and it takes the value 0 otherwise.  We expect that dairy companies may 
be more inclined to offer credit for dairy related investments because these investments can 
be a sign of the commitment of the supplier to continue the production of milk.  Hence, 
INVESTYPE is expected to have a positive impact on TRADECREDIT. 
BANK is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the household received a bank loan 
between 1991 and 1998 and is 0 otherwise.  Bank loans are a strong sign of the 
creditworthiness of the supplier (Johnson et al., 1999; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999).   
Creditworthiness may have a positive impact on the probability of receiving supplier credit, 
i.e. dairy companies are more inclined to offer credit to more creditworthy suppliers.   
However, having access to bank loans may lower the need to apply for supplier credit from 
the dairy.  Substitution of bank loans for supplier credit may result in a negative impact of   17
BANK on TRADECREDIT.  In other words, there are two opposite forces at work and the 
overall effect of BANK is uncertain. 
TOTALINVEST is a measure of the number of investments that were made by the 
household prior to 1999 and takes a value between 0 and 9, with 0 meaning that the 
household didn’t invest between 1991 and 1999, 1 meaning the household invested in one 
asset etc.  This indicator is important to explain the probability of investing.  The more 
investments were made prior to 1999, the less likely the household will be to invest in the 
period since 1999.  TOTALINVEST is expected to have a negative impact on INVEST. 
Finally, we include variables related to the farm and the household. 
FARMSIZE and FARMAGE are proxies for the size and the age of the farm 
respectively.  FARMSIZE is measured by the number of cows on the farm in the year 1998.  
FARMAGE is measured as the number of years that the current farm operator has been in 
charge of the business.  The impact of farm size and age on the probability to receive 
supplier credit is expected to be positive.  On the one hand, size and age are correlated with 
reputation and as a consequence, larger and older farms may be offered more supplier credit 
because dairy companies will have more information about these firms.  Similarly, larger 
farms will deliver more milk and also make more frequent deliveries.  Again this provides 
the dairy company with more regular information about the larger firms.  Finally, larger and 
older firms will have easier access to formal credit sources.  On the one hand, this will act 
as a sign of creditworthiness for the processing company.  On the other hand, the 
availability of other credit sources may lower the demand for supplier credit, depending on 
the terms under which credit is offered by alternative sources (Fafchamps, 1997; Peter and 
Rajan, 1997; Johnson et al., 1999; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). 
Finally, the impact of WAGE on INVEST is ambiguous.  Extra sources of finance 
for investments can increase the likelihood of investing.  Alternatively, off-farm   18
employment can act as a stepping-stone to leave the agricultural sector and households may 
be less inclined to invest in their farm operation if they are planning to leave the sector. 
 
Regression Results 
  Table 9 shows the estimation results.  Columns A to C show that the coefficients of 
the variables related to the dairy company/sector are sensitive to variations in model 
specification.  DURATION has no significant effect on TRADECREDIT.  However, 
DURATION has a significantly negative effect on the likelihood to invest and the result is 
robust for different model specifications.  This result is somewhat surprising as it would 
mean that households that have a less stable relationship with the dairy companies that they 
deliver to, are more likely to invest.   
  FDI has a positive and significant effect on INVEST, but not on TRADECREDIT.  
Farms supplying milk to foreign owned dairy companies are more likely to make 
investments.  However, the result is not robust as the significance disappears in Model B 
where we have left out DURATION. 
  The most important factor determining access to supplier credit is investment 
related.  INVESTYPE has a positive and highly significant impact on TRADECREDIT.  
This means that supplier credit is granted mainly for dairy-specific investments.  This 
finding is in line with our hypothesis that dairy companies are more inclined to support 
investments that show the motivation of the farmer to stay in dairy production.  Or in other 
words, large sunk costs in dairy specific equipment serve as a signal of supplier reliability. 
  BANK does not have a significant impact on access to supplier credit.  This could 
mean two things.  First, obtaining a bank loan does not serve as a strong signal of 
creditworthiness for dairy companies.  Second, farms that have access to bank loans may 
prefer to use these loans instead of supplier credit because, as we have indicated in the   19
previous section, preferential bank loans provide cheaper credit than the dairies.   
  FARMSIZE has a positive and significant effect (except in Model C) on the 
likelihood to receive supplier credit, while FARMAGE has a significantly negative 
coefficient.  Larger farms benefit both from their reputation and from more frequent 
interactions with the dairy company (Fafchamps, 1997; Peter and Rajan, 1997; Johnson et 
al., 1999; McMillan and Woodruff, 1999).  The negative coefficient for FARMAGE 
contradicts what is generally found in the literature and indicates that farms that have been 
taken over more recently are more likely to have made investments in more recent years.  
FARMSIZE and FARMAGE have a highly significant impact on INVEST.  Again, larger 
farms and farms that have changed management more recently have on average invested 
more. 
  Finally, WAGE has a significantly negative impact on INVEST.  This seems to 
support the idea that off-farm employment stimulates farm exits and as such lowers the 
incentives for making investments in the farm operation. 
 
Conclusions 
Agricultural finance in Poland has been dramatically restructured since 1988.   
Before, credit was distributed through the fully state controlled banking system in 
accordance to a State central plan.  It was the Polish government’s instrument to implement 
its agricultural policy, mainly by extending subsidized loans to farmers and co-operatives, 
both state-owned and private. 
Since then the banking sector and macro-economic policy has been reformed and 
liberalized.  While this has caused hyperinflation, high interest rates, and many disruptions 
in the banking and rural finance system in early transition, these transitional features have   20
diminished, some faster than others.  Inflation came down quickly to manageable levels.  
Interest rates have only gradually declined from over 40% to less than 10% annually.   
The restructuring of the banking system and the provision of finance to enterprises 
has taken longer.  The flow of finance to farms and rural enterprises, and recovery of farm 
investments, under the new market finance system seems to have taken off only in the 
second part of the 1990s.   
While many studies report that there remain significant constraints in rural credit 
markets in Poland, our study suggests a more optimistic conclusion.  A large part of Polish 
farms have made investments in the past years, and many of them with loans from either 
banks or processing companies.  Only the smallest and least dynamic farms seem to still 
have significant problems accessing finance for investments.  Virtually all farms with more 
than 10 cows (not exactly an enormous size) have made investments, and three quarters of 
them with loans.   
Processing companies, and in particular dairy companies in our study, have played 
an important role in financial assistance, in particular for dairy-specific investments such as 
cooling tanks and livestock.  In addition, they had an important indirect impact on farm 
activities and investments through their feed supply programs, affecting the overall 
profitability of the farms, and their loan guarantee programs, affecting the access to bank 
loans of the farms.  These assistance programs have been targeted at both large and small 
farms.  
In the perspective of the debate whether institutional problems or cash flow and 
profitability constraints are the most important constraint on farm finance in transition, 
supplier credit and other assistance programs seem to address both.  They simultaneously 
improve the cash flow for the farmer by accessing external financial resources (i.e. company 
level financing) and by linking the programs with delivery schemes.  The latter provide a   21
better cash flow and in many cases improved profitability by restoring marketing channels 
and on-time payments for dairy farms.  At the same time the interlinking of credit and 
output markets through dairy companies, who are well-informed on the specific problems of 
the dairy market, provides for both enforcement and enhanced information in the credit 
contracts, and hence solves some of the most important institutional constraints in the 
finance market. 
While foreign investment in processing companies seems to have played an 
important role in introducing institutional innovations in contracting and financial assistance 
programs for farms, by 2001 there was no significant difference in the programs and 
assistance provided by foreign companies and domestic companies.  This suggests that FDI 
may be important as an initiator of change but that important spillover effects can occur and 
that major innovations can spread through the agri-food system based on domestic 
companies. 
Finally, we believe that these insights have important lessons for other countries.  
The problems identified above as characterizing the dairy sector in early transition are 
similar as those in other transition countries, and even in some developing countries.  While 
Poland had an advanced start in the sense that much of its farming was already in private 
hands at the start of transition, it faced more important constraints in other ways than its 
farming structure.  In the dairy sector analysed here Poland faced major problems in the 
restructuring of this sector due to the very small scale of most Polish dairy farms and the 
low-level of initial milk quality and on-farm technology, even compared to its neighbours in 
Central Europe.  Hence, the results of this paper are particularly important given these 
additional constraints.  They may also provide lessons for other countries in the world, 
especially the poorest, where small-scale dairy production often plays a very important role 
in rural household income and farm production.     22
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Table 1: Share of farms in our survey by size classes and processor 
  Number of cows per farm 
 1 2 3-4 5-9 10-19 ≥20 total
sample 1995  1.7  1.4 12.8 40.7 39.3 4.1  100
sample 2000  5.1  5.9 10.3 26.9 35.9 12.4  100
W-M* 2000  22  13.8 19.1 29.1 13.1 2.9  100
no-FDI** 1995  1.3  1.3 12.1 40.1 42 3.2  100
no-FDI 2000  6.4  3.8 10.2 29.9 31.8 12.7  100
FDI 1995  0.8  0.8 12.7 42.1 38.1 5.6  100
FDI 2000  3.2  5.6 10.3 23.8 42.9 12.7  100
* Warminsko-Mazurskie region 
** no-FDI is the group of farmers that were delivering to a domestic dairy company in 1995; FDI includes 
farmers delivering to a foreign owned dairy in 1995 
 
Table 2: Number of dairy companies with more than 50 employees in Poland, 1993-
1999 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1999  Change 
93-99 (%)
Total 410 332 318 321 320  -22
Cooperatives 352 309 284 280 270  -24
Public companies  30 12 0 0 0  -100
Commercial law companies  28 11 34 41 50  +79
Source: Majewski and Dalton (2000) 
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Table 3: Investments and Loans of Farm Households 
 
# cows  Invests 
(% of total) 
Uses loan 
to invest 
(% of A) 
Uses dairy 
loan 
(% of B) 
Uses bank 
loan 
(% of B) 
Uses dairy 
loan 
(% of A) 
Uses bank 
loan 
(% of A) 
 A  B  C  D  E  F 
1-5 52 54 41 50 21 26 
6-10  78 51 43 70 22 36 
>10  92 74 43 75 31 54 
ALL  76 58 43 69 25 40 
 
 
Table 4:  Investments and loans by type (%) 
 
  Investments  Total Loans  Dairy loans  Bank loans
  % by type  % investm. % by type % by type  % by type
Cows 14  37 14 30  9
Cooling tank  20  55 30 56  20
Stall 24  30 20 3  26
Land 9  46 11 0  14
Fence 11  2 0 2  0
Other 23  38 24 9  30
TOTAL 100  36 100 100  100
 
 
Table 5:  Credit source and loan size (for most important investment) 
 
Loan from 






Loan amount (in PLZ)   
< 5000  29.6 57.7 8.5 4.2  100
5000-10000 34.9 55.8 7.0 2.3  100
10000-50000 22.2 69.4 8.3 0.0  100
> 50000  7.1 92.9 0.0 0.0  100
 
 
Table 6:  Share of farms delivering that have  
made recent investments by dairy type 
 With  Without 
Credit program on-farm inv   84.0  67.7 
Credit program cows  84.4  67.7 
Input supply program  87.8  54.9 
loan guarantee program  89.7  75.2 
Average 86.5  66.4 
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Table 7: Share of farms that increased their herd size  
since 1995 by dairy type 
 With  Without 
Credit program on-farm inv   54.0  44.6 
Credit program cows  55.1  41.5 
Input supply program  52.5  37.3 
loan guarantee program  51.7  38.5 
Average 53.5  40.5 
 
 
Table 8:  Foreign ownership and financial assistance programmes  




Credit program on-farm inv   71.6  71.4 
Credit program cows  73.9  70.7 
Input supply program  78.9  77.5 
loan guarantee program  46.2  29.8 
Average 71.6  71.4 
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Table 9: Regression Results 
 
 
Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value
Sector/Dairy 
company
DURATION -0.151 -5.23 *** -0.005 -0.06 - - - - -0.127 -4.66 *** 0.031 0.39
FDI 0.214 2.66 *** 0.284 1.58 0.097 1.29 0.266 1.56 - - - -
Investment 
characteristics
INVESTYPE - - 0.665 3.50 *** - - 0.669 3.54 *** - - 0.664 3.52 ***
BANK - - -0.127 -0.73 - - -0.077 -0.45 - - -0.164 -0.97
TOTALINVEST 0.027 0.78 - - 0.036 1.06 - - 0.024 0.71 - -
Farm/HH 
characteristics
FARMSIZE 0.022 4.58 *** 0.018 1.69 * 0.022 4.48 *** 0.018 1.66 * 0.021 4.46 *** 0.016 1.56
FARMAGE -0.023 -5.09 *** -0.018 -1.88 * -0.020 -4.54 *** -0.016 -1.58 -0.023 -5.11 *** -0.019 -1.97 **
WAGE -0.247 -2.39 ** - - -0.224 -2.17 ** - - -0.259 -2.53 ** - -
Intercept -0.854 -6.10 *** -2.794 -7.47 *** -1.351 -12.97 *** -2.849 -9.81 *** -0.829 -5.96 *** -2.742 -7.50 ***
Log Likelihood -724.35 -738.32 -728.19
Number of observ 2529 2529 2529
LR test of indep. equations (Rho=0): Chi2=1.65  P>Chi2=0.20  Chi2=1.84  P>Chi2=0.17  Chi2=1.66  P>Chi2=0.20
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Model A Model B
INVEST TRADECREDIT
Model C
INVEST TRADECREDIT INVEST TRADECREDIT